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Introduction 
 
Britain has asserted a new political geography.i Taken together the vote 23rd June 
2016 represents a sum of differently positioned disaffections, shared by an 
electorate drawn from the traditional left and right. These disaffections concern 
the quality and pressure on public services. They also concern wages and income 
levels, population growth and cultural change. There is a deep sense in the UK 
that a political elite cannot be trusted, and do not represent the electorate. Many 
voters also feel strongly that corporations are increasingly remote and lacking in 
accountability for their actions. There is a cumulative, though not cohesive, sense 
that, whatever its economic position in the world, Britain is also a divided 
system. This sense has created the grounds for misinformation, manipulation, 
easy targets for blame, and quick fix solutions.  The British future from Brexit is 
not yet determined because its institutional form remains undecided. However, if 
dominant conceptual frameworks continue to apply then it seems unlikely that 
Brexit will address the underlying causes of grievances, since these transcend 
European Union (EU) membership. They are a product of a common political 
economy, understood as an ideational framework within globalizing processes. 
In the rest of this paper, I focus on some of the common ideational issues arising 
from economics and the possible consequences; other papers in this issue 
provide additional context.     
 
The political economy of a divisive system:  
Leave and Remain as one-choice-as-no-choice? 
 
Whilst it may be true to say that proper consideration of EU membership was 
hampered by a failure to make the case effectively regarding benefits, one cannot 
neglect that the grievances expressed through the Referendum arose in the 
context of that EU membership (for context see Duroy, 2014; Longo & Murray, 
2011; Sloam, 2016). However, there is more to this issue.ii The worker within the 
modern corporation is weaker and poorer than she was 20 years ago. Much of 
the contemporary analysis of capitalism conceptualises it as a globalising system 
of processes (Brenner et al. 2010, Peck, 2013). Differences occur within 
commonalities expressed as core characteristics, which create scope for, but 
limit the degree of, variation.iii The core is expressed through governance 
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operative within the state, the region and more broadly. Governance is more 
than government, it involves regulatory systems and practices, which shape a 
socio-political economy. From this perspective, membership of the EU is a 
specification of more general processes. As such, the grievances that underlie 
Brexit may not be reducible to membership of the EU and whether one is inside 
or outside may not actually be the major issue. Rather, the major issue may be 
oppositional in a different way: grievances concerning a divisive past and 
present versus the potential for a more inclusive-as-fair and hence collectively 
legitimate future. Put another way, Brexit might be thought of as a kind of 
displacement activity: a way to express grievances, but where ultimately being 
inside or outside of the EU is not the fundamental problem, that problem is the 
exclusionary nature of dominant commonalities that transcend membership of 
the EU (Wrenn, 2014).  
One can analyse dominant commonalities from various perspectives. For 
example, one can focus down on mainstream economics as a form of knowledge 
(see Lawson, 2015). One can argue that it is integral to the current forms of 
global, European and local governance. To focus in this way does not imply that 
only economics is of significance. But the nature of economics does have 
consequences for the social reality from which grievances can emerge (and in 
which xenophobia can be encouraged). A significant commonality is that in 
contemporary economics labour is treated as just one more factor of production, 
a unit cost, measured and rewarded in terms of its marginal productivity, and 
where the labour market is ultimately no different than any other. One makes the 
market efficient through augmenting the factor (labour) and by reducing 
‘distortions’ in its ‘free’ interactions. Anything that intercedes between the 
‘market’ and the interacting individual becomes an impediment to ‘efficiency’. As 
such, the collective is immediately positioned as antithetical to this efficiency and 
trade unions become a systemic problem (rather than integral solution), which 
must be suppressed through legislation.  
A tension then arises since efficiency essentially means being more 
(maximally) productive, enabling falling costs through time, but also triggering 
rewards to labour in terms of higher wages to reflect an individual’s contribution. 
Yet for this to actually function then the individual must be the genuine and 
identifiable source of production, whereas one might argue production involves 
an organized set of relations and co-operations. The individual in the labour 
market must also be able to do what collective representation previously did, 
and now is hampered in doing. That is, be aware of and adequately represent 
their own interests in the context of inscribed employment rights, and in the 
context of assumed competition of each and every worker against all other 
potential workers. This is in a context that assumes that any worker may 
undercut the individual, and technology creates a permanent threat to 
employment security. In practical terms, all labour is disempowered. A 
weakened institutional position is expressed through ‘flexicurity’. Economic 
policy reduces the role of trade unions, focuses on supply side economics for 
labour (improving skills and mobility, facilitating matching etc) and places the 
greater responsibility for systemically constrained outcomes on the individual 
(you are unproductive, you are insufficiently skilled, mobile, appropriate, 
valuable, etc.). 
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So, from a dominant conceptual point of view policy translates the social 
human, as a locus of concern that an economy ought to serve, into an economic 
unit, servile within the needs of a particular kind of economy (though the 
justification remains that your interests are served by that system). Notably, the 
claim is that wages are more or less determined by the characteristics of workers 
in market contexts: what they are prepared to do. This is just or fair and the 
system will ensure that wages grow fairly, within a just-as-competitive system. 
This is a central component of a dominant ideational framework, which forms a 
common sense where markets are the idealised arbiters of all economic activity. 
This common sense transcends the EU. At its broadest it is built into the 
dominant neoliberal discourse of globalization (every component must conform 
to precepts of a particular construct of competition or fall behind).  
Of course, globalization as an outcome, is not a cause of anything, it is 
something to be explained, and this includes the positioning of the very idea of 
globalization as a necessary reason why states must conform to policy types. 
What is omitted here is the role of corporations as market actors able to affect 
what can be done, and the role of the state, and regional and global organizations 
in creating policy regimes that underpin the scope for activity of different actors, 
favouring some over others. That is, political power that spreads beyond the 
polity (as the formal institutions of the state) and which can then facilitate 
different institutional ways in which wage growth and income growth are 
reduced over time and more of wealth is captured or concentrated.  
There are many further significant aspects to ideational positioning. Most 
importantly, the centrality of derived demand from labour (the centrality of 
wages and incomes to growth) is suppressed and the issue of the level of 
effective demand is neglected. This marginalizes Keynes’ central insight 
regarding the importance of equitable wages and income for the reproduction of 
a capitalist economy (see Grieve, 2014). Within Keynes’ framework institutions 
are required to ensure limits to inequality. Within the current dominant 
framework the problem of inequality becomes incoherent. Furthermore, 
unemployment appears essentially voluntary. There is a ‘natural rate’. The 
possibility of active expansionary fiscal policy and different investment 
multipliers are marginalized. Socialised investment and orienting and shaping 
investment for the social good, including along ecological lines where one might 
emphasise qualitative transformation rather than quantitative destruction 
becomes conceptually problematic. Fundamental fiscal and investment issues 
are subsumed and confused, becoming minor temporary or localised singular 
policy foci rather than system issues. They are translated and limited via the 
dominant ideational frame, which acts as a kind of obfuscation: that is, self-
equilibrating, efficient-as-just, technologically dynamic free markets, imbued 
with indispensable corporate leadership by pioneering entrepreneurs.    
The point to emphasise here is that this common sense is uncommon, but 
also misleading. It is recognized as unrealistic but is held also as an ideal (a 
rough ‘how things can be and should be’). Its characteristics and timelines vary 
between states. For example, there are differences between the UK’s experience 
beginning in the late 1970s, and Germany’s, whose shift has been more gradual.  
The Hartz labour market reforms came as late as 2003-2005. However, the 
common sense has become integral to global, regional and state institutions, 
expressed in different ways to different degrees, and with different levels of 
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resistance and critique (for example through DiEM25).iv It is the mismatch 
between this common sense and actually experienced reality, which gives rise to 
the kinds of grievances expressed through Brexit. This is not simply an issue of 
left or right politics, though it can carry their traces. Both the Left Exit or Lexit 
position and the more inchoate combining of migration with moral panic have 
economic constituents.  
The loss of trust expressed by citizens is caused rather than arbitrary 
(Morgan and Sheehan, 2015a, 2015b). The deep sense that there is one rule for 
the few and another for the many is created by experience. Intrinsic to this 
situation is a democratic deficit: where interests that have gradually developed 
this common sense have captured institutions, including the state. One finds 
recognizable versions of the common sense within the Washington and post-
Washington consensus, including the particular policies of the World Bank and 
IMF, and the coordinating activity of the WTO, as well as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ liberal 
economic model. And one finds it within the Single Market framework of the EU 
and increasingly within the practices of EU members who are also collectively 
and individually members and participants in these other institutions. The 
common sense forms the basis of shared tendencies and these have been 
variously stated (e.g. Streeck, 2011; 2014).   
Hence, being inside or outside of the EU may not in itself be the main 
issue in terms of Brexit. The nature of globalization is more broadly what is at 
issue (see Palley and Horn, 2013). It is in many respects a measure of the success 
of the common sense that critique of globalization and use of terms such as the 
Washington consensus are loaded, carrying connotations of the political-as-
pejorative, as though the common sense were simply the technical template of 
progress, and to question it was to be anti-progress. It is in many ways ironic 
that the political power that spreads beyond the polity has achieved this, and 
that to question the rules is somehow against the rules. It remains possible to 
provide marginal critiques from within the system but it is extremely difficult to 
get a hearing for critiques of the system (we have Fight Club economics).v 
Critique becomes a social movement problem typically externalised from policy. 
This too has become a source of grievance where externalisation has become 
synonymous with extreme, as though the many were not representative of a 
significant constituency.  
The externalising of fundamental critique needs to be resisted in the 
name of reasoned argument. It is not anti-progress to question the nature of 
progress: to ask for whom, on what basis, and with what costs? If one considers 
the problem of growing inequality over recent decades, Thomas Piketty’s work 
has done much to publicise the increasing concentration of wealth and income 
among a top 10, 5 and 1%. The very fact that it has become meaningful to 
empirically differentiate a 1% (and 5 and 10%) from the rest indicates that the 
kinds of grievances expressed in Brexit are not just issues for localised left-
behind minority interests - there is something more systemically pervasive to 
consider. Moreover, there is more to inequality than simple mechanisms (see 
Lopez-Bernardo et al 2016; Morgan 2015). Rather there are multiple and 
developing relations: a complex and varied system of finance, production and 
trade, a positioning of corporations across many states, and flows of capital and 
goods. This cannot simply be deemed beneficial by virtue of existence, one must 
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also consider its pathologies: financialisation, debt-dependence, exploitation of 
people and environments, wealth capture as well as wealth creation.         
Inequality has manifested to its greatest degree in the USA, but has also 
occurred within all major economies. The UK has a greater income and wealth 
differential between the top 10% and bottom 10% than the EU average, and this 
is far higher for the top 1%. One cannot, therefore, attribute the actual level of 
inequality in the UK to EU membership in some simple way. Inequality varies 
within the EU, and beyond it. The extent within the UK will owe something to 
common factors that transcend the EU and then also some combination of 
factors related to membership (either positive or negative). Voting Leave 
because of economic grievances arising from inequality, as many apparently did, 
seems intuitively misconceived. At the same time, being a member of the EU did 
not prevent inequality and other socio-economic problems that have manifested 
in Brexit. Though it may be possible to distinguish between what being a 
member of the EU has been responsible for and what it has not prevented, if one 
considers the underlying dominant ideational framework then the two start to 
converge. The real issues are: what are the consequences of the framework and 
what are the alternatives that might address the grievances otherwise expressed 
through Brexit? 
 
Be careful what you wish for?  
 
In the UK, the Leave Campaign theme focused on regaining control. However, 
this confuses formal separation with autonomy. It is unlikely that the UK will 
become more independent. It is far more likely that the terms of its 
dependencies will become more complex. The UK must now decide on its future 
institutional arrangements. These may range from becoming a member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), to pursuing a range of bilateral agreements. 
There is an immediate problem here since membership of the EEA will likely 
result in acceptance of free movement preventing effective limits on European 
migration (a central commitment of Leave). Relatedly, limiting migration from 
outside of Europe may also be difficult and counterproductive. The UK already 
has a population that is diverse by ethnicity and country of origin. This 
legitimately draws in family members. Moreover, the UK has a perpetual need 
for both specialised high skilled and unskilled labour, and this is situated to an 
aging demographic and low replacement rate by birth. Various references made 
by politicians to an Australian style ‘points-based’ model seems unlikely to be 
workable in the UK context. Furthermore, one should not neglect that Australia 
actually has very high levels of immigration. The conflation of economic 
migration with the issue of asylum in Europe also requires one to remember that 
Australia’s current refugee policy involves offshore isolation and indefinite 
detention of a kind that contravenes international law and has resulted in 
widespread vilification.   
The main focus of concern stated for the UK’s future institutional 
arrangements is trade relations. Policy discussion is currently about different 
emphases regarding whom to trade with, rather than more fundamentally, what 
kind of economy would address the range of problems that gave rise to Brexit. 
The UK must now negotiate in order to have institutional arrangements in place 
that can become active no later than two years after Article 50 of the Lisbon 
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Treaty is activated (notification of withdrawal). Time is short, resources 
knowledge and skills to be used in negotiation are limited. This is not a position 
of power. Moreover, the point of negotiation is not just access to different 
countries’ markets for goods and capital flows, it is relations with corporations 
as sources of production and finance. The logic of negotiation is not about level 
playing fields, but rather about competition to attract corporations, whilst 
articulating the common sense of ‘free markets’.  
The temptation will be to pursue policies advantageous to rising profit 
shares: that is, allowing more wealth capture from wealth creation. Typical 
means to these ends include: lowering corporation tax, providing investment 
subsidies, emphasising light touch regulation and the flexibility of labour (ability 
to rapidly hire and fire and suppress wage growth). Various think tanks have 
already begun to advocate policies along these lines as ways to transform the UK 
into the ‘new Singapore’. They are, however, simultaneously all policy 
tendencies, which are liable to exacerbate problems such as inequality, whilst 
transferring greater power to corporations, enabling more capture and reducing 
accountability. In any case, many modern corporations operate long supply 
chains with complex production processes in different locales. Being outside of a 
trading bloc disrupts one’s capacity to be part of the chain. This is likely to 
intensify the need for concessions to attract corporate investment, and also 
further a temptation to attract reporting of revenues rather than actual economic 
activity - a tax haven effect. Thereafter, claimed positive consequences of 
economic policy are articulated through the neoliberal common sense. 
Innovation, investment, and productivity effects are by definition left as 
unintended consequences of market interactions: freeing markets leads to 
entrepreneurial dynamism, and ‘better’ growth implies marginal productivity 
gains that are translated into increased real wages. This discourse is familiar: it 
suggests the solution to current problems is more and intensified versions of the 
policy justifications that gave rise to the current situation.  
Concomitantly, the core concerns of post-Brexit policy in the UK seem 
likely to be tightly focused on the economy because of the disruption created by 
Brexit. They are unlikely to be concerned directly with inequality, social mobility, 
democratic accountability and social cohesion as the problems that helped 
trigger Brexit. The Referendum, of course, must now mean any ruling party is 
more aware than ever that these are issues to address. Equally, actually 
addressing them within dominant ways of thought and policy has become more 
difficult. If current forecasts of lower economic growth (or recession) prove 
correct then tax revenues will fall. Based on current dominant common sense for 
economic policy the result will be further austerity, leading to reductions in 
welfare spending, and restrictions on state investment, in the context of concerns 
over budget deficits and long-term net debt. The UK already has recognized 
problems in terms of its dependency on financial services (perhaps a ‘finance 
curse’, Christensen et al, 2016).vi It also has problems regarding the structure of 
its economy, translated and restricted by a framework of ‘balancing’ (Berry and 
Hay, 2016). Dependency and economic structure problems seem likely to be 
exacerbated by the need to rely on financial services tax revenue, as well as likely 
new limits on investment funding, unless the state changes it position on 
sovereign debt. The UK budget deficit for 2015-16 was £75 billion and this was 
higher than forecast, public sector net debt in 2016 stands at £1.6 trillion or just 
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over 83% of GDP. Missing targets for reductions in deficits, and expectations that 
deficits will now grow, combined with a continued increase in net debt are all 
triggers for financial retrenchment within dominant frameworks. This is 
different than the Treasury merely delaying its commitment to deficit reduction 
targets (an austerity framework remains ideationally dominant).   
Responding to immediate economic dislocations in the absence of a 
genuinely active fiscal policy will also likely perpetuate the dominance of 
monetary policy through the role of the Bank of England. Loose monetary policy 
based on zero-bound interest rates seems likely to continue to constrain the 
value of savings, and because of the actual technical measures used, the current 
value of all pensions schemes. Pension scheme liabilities create problems for 
corporations in terms of funding requirements. This provides further 
motivations to shed pension liabilities (reducing pension benefits). In the 
meantime investment is often delayed - so this is one more factor in a situation 
of uncertainty liable to reduce business investment, despite historic low interest 
rates. Lower interest rates also affect long-term annuity rates via the discounting 
calculations applied to bond valuations. The retired, the just-about to retire and 
those most dependent on the state are set, therefore, to be most adversely 
affected by the aftermath of Brexit in the UK (and these were all groups who 
actually tended to vote Leave).   
In the end, Brexit is a regional and global issue not just a UK issue. 
Problems for the UK are also problems for partners and those positioned as 
competitors. Interactions between separated entities, rather than within 
integrated ones, create additional grounds for complexity, breakpoints, 
confusion, distortion and subversion. Brexit may well create problems for 
current initiatives for collective progress, limited though many of them so far 
have been. It inserts a new complication into the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) creating a potential distraction from the core 
problem of corporate accountability.vii It creates further complications for 
collective solutions to tax avoidance, such as unitary taxation (see Morgan, 
2016b). It introduces additional problems into the development and monitoring 
of mechanisms within the new Paris COP 21 climate change agreement (see 
Morgan, 2016a; Spash, 2016).viii It may even have knock-on effects in terms of 
financial stability that exacerbate current problems for the Eurozone.ix This may 
call forth more of the same policies that have socialised costs and created 
extreme distributional harms in some countries (for background, see Patomäki, 
2013; Stockhammer, 2016). Both Deutsche Bank and Unicredit are deeply 
embedded in a set of currently vulnerable relations. Brexit may then signal a 
lurch in neoliberalism, a further evolution and perhaps its death throes (rather 
than merely a ‘failing forwards’).  
 
Conclusion 
  
At the moment, nothing is certain. Often, talk of crises comes to nothing and in 
retrospect problems can lose the sense of significance that immediacy gave them. 
Yet, there is a further danger here. It does not require worse cases to manifest 
for opportunities for something better to have been lost. We should not need 
Brexit to be disastrous to realise it signals something important. Systems are 
fragile and they are fragile because they are constituted through people, but this 
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fragility is also a strength because it is the potential for transformative change. 
One might perhaps argue that the current situation is one of increasing 
alienation and this alienation is a measure of the fragility of the contemporary 
world. The term, of course, is deeply unfashionable, but it is worth considering 
what Marx actually meant (see Wood, 1984). For Marx, alienation expressed 
itself as a deep sense of inauthenticity, a lack of self-worth or existential 
meaninglessness, where the actual potentials of the human were somehow being 
harmed by the system we live in (even as the scope of those potentials was 
broadening through material progress based on that system). There is something 
ultimately Aristotelian about this: a recognition that there is a person who can 
both suffer and flourish. Brexit seems to want to answer this question of 
suffering and flourishing in partial ways without ever having explicitly asked it.x   
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i Thanks to Steve Fleetwood and Tony Lawson for comments. 
ii There has in the UK, for example, been a breakdown of the social contract between capital and 
labour, but also a breakdown of intergenerational solidarity. If one looks through recent data and 
reports from the Institute for Fiscal Studies or the Rowntree Foundation then various trends 
emerge. The UK economy has increased in size by 50% since 1995 yet the real income of the 
average 40 year old (allowing for inflation and housing costs) is approximately what it was in 
1995. At the same time actual household debt levels are about twice what they were in 1995. 
Those below 40 are now increasingly renters (80% of those 25 or younger rent or live with their 
parents), they lack access to final salary pension schemes (there were 5 million private sector 
scheme members in 1995 and less than 500,000 in 2014), they now carry tuition fee debt, are 
less likely to be a member of a union, and those unions are weaker than at any time in the last 
100 years in terms of the legal scope for action.  
iii This is not to suggest the whole is simply reproducing itself without any prospect of 
fundamental change or transformation.  
iv The Democracy in Europe Movement whose initial prime movers include Saskia Sassen, Yanis 
Varoufakis, Noam Chomsky, Susan George and Tony Negri https://diem25.org 
v A good example of limited acknowledgements of problems from within the common sense is 
Ostry et al (2016) published in an IMF journal.   
vi Christensen et al (2016, pp. 4-5) argue that advanced economies can suffer a finance curse that 
is analogous to the recognized resource curse that afflicts some developing economies: 
cumulative over dependence on a single economic sector has adverse effects on the overall 
structure and subsequent evolution of a political economy. The UK has the third largest financial 
sector in the world and is the largest of these by proportion of the economy. It is a centre of 
financialisation; capital inflows to the financial sector maintain high exchange rates which reduce 
the capacity of other sectors such as manufacturing to expand via exports (encouraging an 
import dependency within globalization); finance attracts a disproportionate number of skilled 
workers who might otherwise contribute to other sectors; the state becomes dependent on tax 
revenues from the sector (despite tax avoidance) and lobby groups for finance pursue political 
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capture that cumulatively shapes and distorts policy, encouraging the dislocation of 
representative democracy from the broader citizenship; the net effect is also to contribute to 
asset bubbles, periodic financial crises through pro (‘light’) finance regulation, the socialisation of 
costs, and a loss of trust in the political system.  
vii TTIP is not about reducing real trade barriers between states, since there are few between EU 
members and the USA, it is mainly about protections of corporate privilege in the name of free 
trade: strengthening and extending copyright and patents and the creation of extra-judicial 
mechanisms (Investor-State Dispute Settlements or ISDS) to settle disputes between 
corporations and states in ways that reduce the capacity of states to intervene in corporate 
activity in their own jurisdiction since this becomes a barrier to trade. TTIP creates a space for 
corporations to avoid democratic accountability and augments their power to increase 
profitability (lobbying has been led by telecoms, finance, pharmaceuticals and the large software 
firms). Notably TTIP provides a mechanism through which corporations can resist emissions 
reduction regulation, since interventions can be categorised as trade barriers. 
viii The new Conservative government under Theresa May immediately scrapped the Department 
of Energy and Climate Change and created a Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Department. DECC had three main foci: cheap and secure energy for consumers and businesses, 
supporting economic growth and reducing carbon emissions. The three are in tension. The new 
department signals a further transition (already begun under the previous regime) away from 
prioritising carbon emissions reduction (via the Climate Change Act 2008). Achievement is left to 
market and technology changes over time.  
ixThis has various channels. For example, Brexit will likely cause at least short-term reductions in 
trading activity in the EU. This in turn may place greater pressure on firms and thus on the banks 
carrying their debts. Also, some banks continue to carry large volumes of non-performing loan 
‘assets’ and are recycling debt for ‘zombie’ firms in order not to manifest losses on their accounts 
(though this varies by country). Fear effects related to anything that might upset this vulnerable 
position create grounds for collapses in equity as well as withdrawal of corporate deposits. This 
creates bank funding problems (in REPO markets, etc). Low interest rates also narrow the 
transformation range for banks, reducing margins/returns on current lending. The overall 
damage to capitalisation and Tier 1 capital is potentially progressive but also subject to sudden 
triggers (such as failing a stress test). It creates calls on the state for recapitalisation and 
socialisation of losses (However, there are new rules for bank equity and bailouts/ins which 
create new compliance problems with unintended consequences). Italy is a prime candidate for 
financial crisis, based on these channels. According to the IMF, approximately 18% of debt at 
Italian banks is suspect (€360 billion).  
x Strictly speaking since Brexit involved many differently positioned reasons and arguments then 
any adequate use of the term alienation must also address the issue of the different degrees of 
awareness of fundamental issues these positions might involve. For example, the Left Exit or 
Lexit movement was quite different than the UKIP or Leave inspired positions. Both articulated 
issues of sovereignty and democratic accountability but involve quite different concepts of what 
democracy is as an actual form and how it relates to an economy. The Lexit position grew from 
the 1970s socialist opposition to the then EEC and so might be self-consciously anti-alienation.   
